The evolution of cooperation in group-structured populations has received much attention, but little is known about the effects of different modes of migration of individuals between groups. Here, we have incorporated four different modes of migration that differ in the degree of coordination among the individuals. For each mode of migration, we identify the set of multiplayer games in which the cooperative strategy has higher fixation probability than defection. The comparison shows that the set of games under which cooperation may evolve generally expands depending upon the degree of coordination among the migrating individuals. Weak altruism can evolve under all modes of individual migration, provided that the benefit to cost ratio is high enough. Strong altruism, however, evolves only if the mode of migration involves coordination of individual actions. Depending upon the migration frequency and degree of coordination among individuals, conditions that allow selection to work at the level of groups can be established.
Introduction
exponential mapping are (36; 48; 66)
.
(2)
The ratio of the fixation probabilities is given by (46)
Whether this ratio is greater than 1 (i.e. cooperators are favoured) depends 87 solely on the sign of
Combining Eqs.
(3) and (5) we obtain Caravan migration mode, where multiple migrants go to the same group. (e) Differential migration mode, where cooperators have higher chances to migrate than defectors. In each case, the quantity Λ determines whether cooperation evolves or not, cf. Fig. 2 .
Here, the outcome of evolution is determined by the sign of Λ 1 , given by
The equation for the sign sum Λ 1 contains the sign sum of the single group 128 mode, Λ 0 , as the second term. The first term (m − 1)(a n − b 0 ) is proportional 129 to the fitness difference of the purely cooperative group and the purely de-130 fecting group, and describes the effect of group migration. Eq. 7 explicitly 131 expresses conditions for selection to favor cooperation in the single individual 132 migration mode (31) through payoffs from a multiplayer game that is played 133 within groups. 134 Groups of cooperators send out more migrants than groups containing 135 high frequencies of defecting types, which means that cooperative strategies Another mode of migration is one where migrants leave simultaneously.
143
For this mode we assume that every migration event carries propagules of a 144 finite number. For illustrative purposes, we discuss propagules of size 2 or 145 'pair migration'. In this case, we consider the probability that two deviating 146 individuals take over the population. The sign sum is The probability that the number of migrants entering the same group is 171 equal to k is given by
The probability that at least one migrant is successful is equal to
Here φ Caravan C is the probability of a successful invasion of a group of defectors 174 by a cooperative group.
175
Similarly, the expected probability of the opposite event is
Thus, the ratio of fixation probabilities at the group level is
If p 1 − φ, the probability that the group invaded by the first migrant is 178 eventually taken over approaches 1, such that the result becomes independent 179 of φ C and φ D . The group that receives the first migrant will be invaded with 180 a probability equal to 1. The flow of migrants from one group to another 181 means that the invaded group will be converted with a probability equal to 1. The ratio of fixation probabilities at the group level in this limit is
The sign sum (see Eq. (7)) for this mode is then
This is larger than in the migration mode for a single individual Λ 1 , as 185 Λ 0 < 0 for traits that are disadvantageous at the individual level (a i < b i ).
186
An increase in the number of groups in a population significantly increases abilities on the group level as
Therefore, the sign sum in this mode is
The difference in migration rates (λ C > λ D ) provides an advantage to co-205 operating groups, which emits proportionally more migrants in this mode. To be more concrete, we now apply the results of the previous sections 220 to different social dilemma games (12; 6; 38; 47). In social dilemma games, 221 the average payoff to players increases with the number of cooperators, but 222 defectors gain higher payoff than cooperators. An example of a pairwise 223 social dilemma is the prisoner's dilemma, which is extensively used for the 224 study of the evolution of cooperation (6; 44; 15). For our purposes, it is 225 useful to differentiate between weak and strong altruism. 2. If a player switches from defection to cooperation, their payoff de-
Strong altruism is always disadvantageous in populations without struc-251 ture, i.e. Λ 0 < 0. In addition, we find that 
268
Public goods games are a type of multiplayer game where each player can 269 make a donation to a public pool. The collected amount is then multiplied, 270 and evenly shared amongst all players, including those that decided not to 271 make a donation. Weak and strong altruism can be naturally represented by 272 self-returning benefit and self-excluding benefit games, respectively (59; 14).
273
In self-returning benefit games, the public goods are shared among all par- 
300
In the simplest version of the game incorporating synergy and discount-301 ing, the first cooperator in the group pays a cost γ to generate β units of 302 Table 1 :
Payoffs and their differences for the linear self-returning (LSR), the linear self-excluding (LSE), the synergy/discounting self-returning (SDSR), and the synergy/discounting self-excluding (SDSE) public goods games. a i is the payoff to a cooperator in a group of size n with i cooperators, and b i is the payoff for a defector. The sum of the payoff difference a i − b i determines the value of Λ 0 (see Eq. 4). Switching from defection to cooperation leads to a payoff difference a i − b i−1 . Switching always decreases payoffs for the self-excluding benefit games (LSE and SDSE); however, the change in payoff for the self-returning benefit games (LSR and SDSR) can be positive and therefore cooperators could have a higher fixation rate than defectors in these games. (synergy/discounting game with self-excluding benefit, or SDSE game).
308
The payoffs a i and b i to players in these games (LSR, LSE, SDSR and 309 SDSE) and their differences are presented in Table 1 . For each of these games The evolution of cooperation does not always become easier with increasing benefit β. Cooperation is advantageous in terms of fixation probabilities if the sign sum Λ calculated for migration modes (lines) is positive (shaded region). In the well mixed case, Λ 0 decreases in self-excluding games and stays constant for selfreturning games. In the single individual migration mode and the differential migration mode, cooperation becomes easier with increasing benefit in the self-returning case, but harder in the self-excluding case. In the pair migration mode and in caravan migration, cooperation becomes easier with increasing benefit for all games with the current parameter set. (n = 24 for the well mixed population, m = 6 and n = 4 in migration models, ζ = 1.35, intensity of selection w = 0.1, cost of cooperation γ = 1, group migration bonus factor in differential migration mode w −1 ln(λ C /λ D ) = 5, colors as in Fig. 1 ). 
ratio is large enough. Clearly, increasing synergy in self-returning games 320 favours cooperation.
321
For the games representing strong altruism (LSE and SDSE), even for the 322 individual migration mode, cooperators have no selective advantage (Λ 1 < 0).
323
For the pair migration and caravan migration modes, strong altruism may 324 have a selective advantage over defection and in LSE game this is possible if 325 the benefit to cost ratio is high enough. Under differential migration strong 326 altruism also can have a selective advantage in the LSE game. However, 327 the prerequisites for this are restrictive: the group migration bonus factor 328 w −1 ln(λ C /λ D ) must be high enough to ensure a strong implicit advantage 329 to cooperators. Interestingly, an increase in the benefit to cost ratio works In the caravan migration mode, the SDSE game, similar to the linear LSE 341 game, promotes cooperation if the benefit to cost ratio (β/γ) is high enough.
342
However, synergy of cooperators makes cooperation successful at lower values Table 3 : Sign sums for self-excluding public good games (strong altruism) in a well mixed population and under different modes of migration.
of benefit to cost ratio than in the LSE game. Finally, in the SDSE game
The fixation probability for one individual of the two strategies in a well 440 mixed population is equal to (46; 64)
The ratio of these fixation probabilities is For group structure and small migration rates, the trait of interest first 446 needs to fix in a group (φ C ) and then that group needs to fix in the population 447 (Φ C ). The total fixation probability ratio is thus equal to
Here
e wan e wb 0 e wΛ 0 = e w(m−1)(an−b 0 +Λ 0 ) .
Therefore the total fixation probability ratio is
Thus, the sign sum for the single individual migration mode is 
Here T i+ = ... and T i− = ... are probabilities to increase or decrease the 460 number of players with a chosen strategy if there are currently i players.
461
Because φ 0 = 0, φ 2 is
Therefore, the ratio of individual-level fixation probabilities in the pair mi-463 gration mode is
1 + e −w(a 1 −b 1 ) 1 + e w(a n−1 −b n−1 ) = exp wΛ 0 + ln 1 + e −w(a 1 −b 1 ) 1 + e w(a n−1 −b n−1 ) . (A.9)
The total ratio of fixation probabilities (taking into account that the invading 465 strategy starts with one player in the first group, and with two players in all 466 following migration invasions) is
w(a n−1 −b n−1 ) (A.10) and the sign sum is
In the caravan migration mode with large p, the probability of successful 470 invasion of one group into another is equal to 1. Therefore, the ratio of 471 group-level fixation probabilities is
This way the total fixation probabilities ratio is
and the sign sum in the caravan migration mode is
In the differential migration mode, the groups have control over the mi-476 gration probabilities of the players. This affects the fixation probabilities at 477 the group level. The migration probabilities no longer cancel,
e wan e wb 0 e wΛ 0 +ln
) Therefore, the total fixation probability ratio is
and the sign sum becomes
The sign sum for the SDSE game in the pair migration mode is:
(A.18) If benefit β is high enough β n − 1, β n−1 ζ n−1 , then the sign sum
Therefore, the sign sum is positive at high benefit values, if the number of 485 groups m is high enough: m > 1 + 1−ζ n−1 1−ζ . In the case of the discounting 486 game (ζ < 1), this condition is more restrictive than m ≥ 2, which is always 487 required in multilevel selection models. show that this result holds true with any mapping.
492
In terms of fitness, strong altruism is characterized by two properties: creases. That is f a (i) < f b (i − 1).
499
The ratio of fixation probabilities in the structured population is given 500 by φc φ d · Φc Φ d (65). We calculate each term separately.
501
The ratio of fixation probabilities of a single cell in a group of opposite 502 composition (36; 46) is
The ratio of fixation probabilities of a single group in a population of 504 opposite composition is
Combining Eqs. (B.1) and (B.2) we get the ratio of fixation probabilities of 506 a single cell in a population of opposite composition:
(B.3) Expression in parenthesis can be rewritten:
. (B.4) Thus, the fixation probabilities ratio is equal to
(B.5) So, the inability of the strong altruism to emerge in a single individual 510 migration mode holds true for all possible payoff to fitness mappings. 
